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BOOK REVIEWS
God and Skepticism, by Terence Penelhum. D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983.
Pp. xii + 186. $34.95.
KENNETH KONYNDYK, Calvin College.
Ordinarily, Christians and skeptics are thought to be strange bedfellows. After
all, what attitudes could be more diametrically opposed than the unbridled credulousness of the Christian believer and the studies and deliberately adopted
incredulity of the skeptic? Yet throughout the history of the church, various
Christian thinkers have thought they found in the skeptic's outlook a way of
defending their faith. Richard Popkin has recently mined a rich lode of such
thought in his The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, showing how
numerous self-styled defenders of the faith during the seventeenth century made
use of the skeptic's arsenal of arguments. But before and after the seventeenth
century there have been many other Christian thinkers eager to point out the
pretensions and the fallibility of human reason, often using skeptical conundrums
to accomplish this, in order to persuade people that their faith is solider if it has
no support from "worldly wisdom."
Although Penelhum is opposed to the fideist attitude as well as the use of
skepticism to advance the cause of faith, this book is directed mainly against
the fideist's use of skeptical arguments. He examines the views of several skeptical
fideists, pausing when appropriate to criticize their lines of argument or their
views of faith. Penelhum claims that skepticism does not serve the cause of
Christian faith and actually constitutes a hindrance to it. He does not believe,
as some skeptical fideists do, that tearing down reason is necessary to bring
people to faith. This book presents his case in a way that connects some central
historical figures with some contemporary debates about the rational justifiability
of religious beliefs.
Although by Penelhum's lights, the skeptic and the believer still tum out to
be strange bedfellows, by the time we reach the end of the book, Penelhum has
provided a great deal of insight into this unlikely alliance, both in terms of the
great historical figures he treats and some of the main arguments pursued by
this tradition. This book is an important contribution to the contemporary discussion of the rationality of religious belief. It advances our analysis by means of
a historical as well as an analytical treatment of the parity argument. Many of
the connections among the seventeenth century debates, Hume and Kierkegaard,
and the present discussions are illuminating and fascinating.
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Fideism is described as the position that reason cannot support faith and that
faith has no need of rational support. A skeptical fideist then is one who holds
in addition that reason is impotent to give us knowledge outside as well as inside
the sphere of faith. He attempts to support fideism by appealing to skepticism.
This skeptical fideism comes in two varieties, "conformist" and "evangelical."
The conformist skeptical fideist, exemplified by Montaigne and Bayle,
endorses the skeptical arguments against our rational abilities and believes (in
the case of Bayle) that Christianity is inconsistent with the deliverances of reason.
Accepting the pyrrhonian suspension of judgment as the recipe for quietude and
peace of mind, this type of skeptical fideist recommends conformity to the faith
of the rest of the culture, the Christian faith.
Evangelical fideists, such as Pascal and Kierkegaard, while accepting the
skeptical expose of the pretensions of human reason, emphatically reject the
skeptic's recommendation of suspension of judgment, "moderate feeling," and
conformity. They accept the diagnosis as correct, but they find the suggested
cure to be a recipe for despair. We are unable to suspend our common sense
beliefs. Even after the arguments against our beliefs have been convincingly
presented, we cannot help but believe as passionately as ever. Likewise in the
realm of faith, the believer has the answer to the despair induced by the skepticpassionate, committed, rationally unsupportable faith. Since reason cannot show
that the beliefs of common sense are justified but we should believe them anyway,
so also with religious beliefs-we should accept them rather than the skeptic's
despair.
Penelhum picks out a type of argument employed by these skeptical fideists,
calling it the "parity" argument because of the alleged parity between the rational
jus1ification of religious beliefs and that of common sense beliefs. He discusses
various forms of this argument as the book proceeds.
The version of the parity argument used by the Conformist Skeptical Fideist
involves applying pyrrhonism to religious belief. The various skeptical considerations that are part of the pyrrhonist tradition undermine the rational justification
of all our beliefs, secular and religious alike. The appropriate response to religious
beliefs is therefore the same as that to secular beliefs-suspension of judgment,
moderate feeling with respect to things unavoidable, and conformity to the
customs and traditions of one's fathers (or one's community). This argument,
Penelhum rightly points out, makes room only for a form of faith so tepid that
it hardly merits the label, especially within the Christian tradition.
The Evangelical form of the Parity argument is harder to nail down even
though Penelhum discusses it at greater length. This type of skeptical fideism
is concerned to expose reason as incompetent, especially in religion, and to show
tha1 the inabilities of reason-to discover that there is a God, for example-actually serve the Christian faith. Use of reason in religion only confirms the hiddenness of God and inability of reason to find answers to the despair it induces.
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This form of the Parity argument proceeds along the following lines: Skeptical
and rational considerations show that we are unable to demonstrate God's existence and that we are likewise (and for similar reasons) unable to justify many
crucial common sense beliefs. Since they are each equally unsupported by reason,
there is no reason to accept one but not the other, and no reason to reject one
and not the other. Since we accept (and can hardly reject) the beliefs of common
sense, we should equally accept belief in God.
Penelhum criticizes this position by pointing out, first, that these Evangelical
Fideists haven't ruled out the tepid response of the Conformist, even though
they suppose themselves to have argued for the place of passion in religious
faith. Secondly, there is a potentially relevant difference between our adherence
to common sense beliefs and our adherence to religious beliefs. While common
sense beliefs take effort to resist, religious beliefs apparently do not. Thirdly,
the demonstrated parity doesn't cut in favor of one religious belief system over
another, and finally, there are various ways of arguing against parity. This leads
Penelhum to a consideration of David Hume.
Penelhum observes that Hume's employment of skeptical arguments against
common sense beliefs, coupled with his view that such beliefs should and would
nevertheless continue to be held, leaves him vulnerable to the parity argument.
Furthermore, it is his conviction that Hume himself recognized this and tried to
argue against the rational parity of religious beliefs with common sense beliefs.
Penelhum presents and evaluates three different lines of defense against the parity
argument that he finds in Hume.
Hume's first line of defence is to explain religious belief as pathological. It
is not natural and instinctive, it can be dislodged, it originates in fear, and it
hinders science. The second line is that the parity argument yields only a vague
and unreligious deism, not Christianity. And Hume's third line of defence,
according to Penelhum, is to accept this vague deism and be a conformist fideist,
something he thinks many people have done. Penelhum is himself sympathetic
to what he presents as the second line of defense.
Although he argues against accepting the evangelical fideists' version of the
parity argument, there is another, weaker version which Penelhum accepts. This
is the "permissive" parity argument, which he takes from some recent writings
of Alvin Plantinga and Norman Malcolm. According to this argument, religious
belief is shown to be rationally permissible because of the parity between the
justification of religious beliefs and other common beliefs. Religious believers
can at least be defended against the charge of irrationality-they have not adopted
rationally impermissible beliefs.
In a concluding chapter on the nature of faith, Penelhum rejects the view of
the skeptical fideist that undermining reason is an aid to faith. The "conformist"
can only offer too tepid a version of faith and the "evangelical" wrongly makes
destruction of the pretensions of reason a necessary condition of faith. Penelhum
concludes the book with his own account of the nature of faith. According to
him, trust rather than belief is the essence of faith, although trust must rest upon
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certain beliefs about the person trusted. Thus he criticizes Aquinas for making
belief the essence of faith, and he rejects the Wittgensteinian "form of life" view
on the ground that it identifies faith with the fruits of faith.
III

Penelhum's book would be stronger if he had further clarified two of its central
ideas-fideism and parity. He characterizes fideism in two different ways. First,
in the Preface, it is said to be the view that "faith is not undermined but
strengthened, if we judge that reason can give it no support" (p. ix). Then in
Chapter One, fideism becomes the position that faith needs no justification from
reason. These two positions are different; John Calvin, for example, appears to
have held the second but not the first. Furthermore, a fideist of the first type is
much likelier to be attracted by skeptical arguments than a fideist of the second
type. One who holds that faith needs no justification from reason might nevertheless hold that rational justification are available, and thus denigrating reason
need be no part of his position. I believe this to be the position of St. Thomas
Aquinas, and I think making Aquinas a fideist is reason to be suspicious of
Penelhum's characterization.
Closely associated with fideism is a refusal to affirm a principle which we
might call evidentialism: the view that belief in God is rationally improper unless
it JS based on evidence. Or, as the New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967) puts it,
" ... since faith is essentially mediate cognition, it must be based on an immediately
evident cognition in order to be acceptable to a rational being .... " According to
Penelhum's second characterization, denial of evidentialism is sufficient to make
one a fideist, at least if we understand justification to be on the basis of other
beliefs. But someone who, like Alvin Plantinga, denies the evidentialist principle
but holds that belief in God can be properly basic and who would welcome a
convincing proof of God's existence if one could be found, then turns out to be
a fJdeist. Nor is denying evidentialism a necessary condition of being a fideist.
Some fideists, and perhaps Pierre Bayle is an example, affirm evidentialism and
go on to claim that belief in God is not rational but we should (or at least may)
beheve anyway. So, although denying evidentialism frequently is linked with
fideism, denying it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of being a
fideist.
What is the core idea of fideism? Certainly part of the core is affirming the
primacy of faith. But what else? I do not think it is just a lack of reliance on
reason in holding religious beliefs, nor is it simply a denial of the need for
reasons. I think it is the exclusion of giving or having reasons for religious faith.
Then an extreme fideist is a fideist who goes on to hold that reasons are to be
excluded in the area of faith because it is not possible to give any. A skeptical
fideist is an extreme fideist who bases that position on a skeptical view of the
capacities of reason in general.
Penelhum does not bring out all these distinction, and this leads him, I think,
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to give an inadequate account of skeptical fideism. According to him, skeptical
fideism is " ... any attempt to show that faith is immune to the demands of reason
by using arguments from [the literature of philosophical skepticism]" (p. 2).
While I agree with Penelhum that Montaigne and Bayle are skeptical fideists by
this test, I think it dubious at best that Pascal and Kierkegaard are. It is not clear
to me that Pascal and Kierkegaard reach very deeply into the trove of skeptical
arguments to show that faith is totally different from reason. Kierkegaard brings
forward quasi -Kantian considerations against the project of proving God's existence. But the burden of his claim is that while reason may be competent to
determine objective truth, that is not the kind of truth that counts in religion.
Truth in religion is subjective. He does not make this case by using arguments
from the skeptical tradition. Kierkegaard sees no need to support faith by inducing
wholesale skepticism and he does not use skeptical arguments that way. He is
an extreme fideist but not a skeptical fideist.
The essential point in skeptical fideism is not the use of skeptical arguments
from the philosophical skeptics; it is the general rejection of the possibility of
evidence and justification, combined with acceptance of the need for faith.
IV

Another feature of Penelhum's book which merits further scholarly attention
and analysis is his treatment of what he calls the parity argument. Penelhum
uses his development of this argument to offer considerable insight into Hume's
philosophy of religion, seeing Hume's writings on religion as a systematic
response to such an argument.
I think, though, that the three kinds of argument which he brings together
under this rubric are so different that it is misleading to call them all "the parity
argument." I also think that Kierkegaard and Plantinga, to whom Penelhum
attributes different versions of the parity argument are not arguing from consideration of parity in the passages he cites.
The conformist parity argument is a genuine parity argument. Religious beliefs,
like political, moral, and physical beliefs, lack rational justification, according
to the conformist. The conformist supports this contention with skeptical arguments and then adds the pyrrhonist prescription-suspension of belief, moderate
feeling in things unavoidable, and conformity to the beliefs of the community.
The conclusion is that one should follow the religious beliefs of one's community.
Not only is this a parity argument, it also clearly fits Penelhum's characterization
of skeptical fideism. This is not so clearly the case for the other two versions
of the argument.
The argument Penelhum presents as the evangelical skeptical fideist's parity
argument involves the claim that common sense beliefs and belief in God are
analogous in being "faith" beliefs. Since the lack of an intellectual justification
does not prevent us from holding common sense beliefs, there must be some
irrational factor-sin is the usual suggestion-which prevents people from
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holding religious beliefs. But it is inconsistent to reject the religious beliefs while
one accepts the common sense beliefs. Hence anyone who accepts common
sense beliefs should also accept religious ones.
This argument is a parity argument, but it is less clearly a skeptical argument,
and I can see little reason for attributing it to Kierkegaard as Penelhum does.
The "parity" premise, that religious beliefs and common sense beliefs are
analogous in being "faith" beliefs, does not require skeptical arguments for it to
be established, although a philosopher might try to establish it that way. One
might argue instead that these crucial beliefs are analogous in being basic. So
this parity argument seems to me to have only an accidental connection with
philosophical skepticism.
I am unconvinced by Penelhum's attempt to find this parity argument in
Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments. It seems to me that there Kierkegaard's
interest is in removing religious truth from the arena of objective truth where
evidentialist rules of justification of belief apply. He has no interest in claiming
that there is no objective truth, but rather that the methods for establishing or
justifying this kind of knowledge are inadequate to establish religious faith, and
that its methods are frustrated by religious beliefs.
Penelhum attributes his third type of parity argument, the permissive version,
to Alvin Plantinga and Norman Malcolm. But I believe that while the argument
Penelhum presents is interesting and significant, it is not Plantinga's and Malcolm's argument. Plantinga and Malcolm are both arguing for the rational permissibility of religious belief, but they are not doing so based on considerations
of parity. In each of their arguments, they attack the demand for grounds (Malcolm) or evidence (Plantinga), arguing that such a demand is unwarranted or
confused when applied to belief in God. They attack the notion that, in the words
quoted earlier from the New Catholic Encyclopedia, belief in God is "essentially
mediate knowledge." Furthermore, for Plantinga, belief in God resembles other
beliefs which seem to him to be properly basic, and so he concludes that belief
in God can be properly basic.
As Penelhum states the permissive parity argument (pp 150-1), the idea of
parity plays no role. Nor does he claim that the conclusion somehow follows
from considerations of parity. Thus I think that the argument is not aptly described
as a parity argument and compared with other parity arguments. Of course, I
should not be construed as claiming that the argument Penelhum gives us is of
no intrinsic interest; just the opposite is true.
Penelhum overlooks some recent writings which present clear versions of the
permissive parity argument. One is found in the last sentence of Plantinga's God
and Other Minds (Cornell, 1967): "if my belief in other minds is rational, so is
my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the
latter." (p 271) Another is the "tu quoque" argument criticised by W. W. Bartley
III in his The Retreat to Commitment (London, 1964), p 90:
"(1) [F]or certain logical reasons, rationality is so limited that everyone
has to make a dogmatic irrational commitment; (2) therefore, the Chris-

